Stinton v Stinton; Sub Nom. Stinton v Motor Insurers Bureau [1995]
- Reported: [1995] R.T.R. 167; [1999] LLOYDS REP. I.R. 305
- Year: 1995
- Court: Court of Appeal
FACTS:
At 3 a.m. on April 23 1983 the Claimant was the front seat passenger in a car belonging to and being driven by his brother, the First Defendant, of whom both were drunk, when the car left the road colliding with a lamp post. The Claimant suffered severe head injuries.
The First Defendant was driving without insurance and as any judgement against him was unlikely to be satisfied the MIB had been contacted. The Judge found that they, together with q third man, had been using the car on a joint venture. The Claimant knew that from the outset of the evening’s drinking that he was to be carried around uninsured and was quite content to go out with is brother on the basis that the vehicle was to be their joint means of transport throughout the night.
The court held that a passenger in a car knowing the driver to be uninsured and allowing himself to be carried in it in pursuance of a joint enterprise was “a person using the vehicle” for the purposes of clause 6 (1) of the Motor Insurers Bureau Agreement of 1972 one was thus not entitled to receive compensation from the MIB.
Clause 6 of the 1972 agreement provides;
“(1) MIB shall not incur any liability under… this agreement in a case where…(c) at the time of the accident the persons suffering… bodily injury in respect of which the claim is made was allowing himself to be carried in a vehicle and … (ii)… being a person using the vehicle, he was using… the vehicle… without there being in force… a contract of insurance”
The Claimant appealed against this decision in the Court of Appeal before Lord Justice Nourse, Lord Justice Beldam and Sir John Megaw.
HELD:
Lord Justice Beldam affirmed that the issue to be determined was whether the judge was correct to hold that the Claimant was a person using the car within clause 6 (1)(c)(ii) of the agreement.
It was submitted for the MIB, that the decision in Brown v Roberts (1965) 1 QB 1 namely that “use” meant “control, manage or operate” should apply to the present case. This was disputed by the Claimant, whom stated that there had been no element of control or management of the vehicle at the relevant time by the Claimant.
He went on to state that control or management of a vehicle or operation of it could be determined before as well as in the course of its use, for example where two or more persons agreed on a join venture and to use a vehicle for a particular purpose they would have exercised an element of control or management in its use: Leathley v Tatton (1980) RTR 21.
Beldam LJ concluded that the wording of the sub clause in the agreement was wide enough to include a person allowing himself to be carried in the vehicle pursuance of a joint venture with another and in the instant case was evidence on which the judge could finds that the Claimant was so engaged. He dismissed the appeal.
Lord Justice Nourse agreed. Once it was accepted that someone could use a vehicle without being its driver, there arose a question of fact and degree as to whether , a passenger could be described as “a person using the vehicle” within the meaning of clause 6 (1)(c)(ii) of the MIB agreement. In the great majority of cases either or both of the tests of control or management or of joint enterprise would be found to apply to a person within the subclause.
Sir Megaw agreed with his fellow Lordships that the appeal should be dismissed.
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