FACTS:

The Defendant’s employee, had driven an ice cream van from a roadway on to Trafalgar Square, London and was stopped by a police constable for driving offences. The police constable was of the opinion that the vehicle was not roadworthy and informed the driver that he was arranging for a vehicle examination to be carried out forthwith. The Defendant was informed, and he arrived at the scene, took the keys out of the ignition and refused to hand them over to the police constable. The police constable informed the Defendant that his refusal to hand over the keys constituted obstructing a police constable in the execution of his duty. The police constable then asked the Defendant for his name and address in order to service a summons on him. When the Defendant refused to supply those details, the police constable attempted to arrest him. The Defendant resisted arrest and the police constable was injured.

The Defendant was then charged with wilfully obstructing a police constable in the execution of his duty and assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty, under s.89(1) and (2) of the Police Act 1996.  The defendant contended that the police constable was not acting in the execution of his duty, since, as the vehicle was not on a road, the police a constable did not have the power to authorise the vehicle examination under s.67 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.  The stipendiary magistrate was of opinion that the vehicle was on a road and that the police constable was entitled to demand the keys from the Defendant, and he convicted the defendant pursuant to s.89 of the Act of 1996.

The defendant’s appeal to the Crown Court was dismissed.

s.67 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 [as amended by s.10 of the Road Traffic Act 1991] provides:

“(1) An authorised examiner may test a motor vehicle on a road for the purpose of–(a) ascertaining whether the following requirements, namely–(i) the construction and use requirements, and (ii) the requirement that the condition of the vehicle is not such that its use on a road would involve a danger of injury to any person, are complied with as respects the vehicle; and (b) bringing to the notice of the driver any failure to comply with those requirements. (2) For the purpose of testing a vehicle under this section the examiner–(a) may require the driver to comply with his reasonable instructions, and (b) may drive the vehicle. (3) a vehicle shall not be required to stop for a test except by a constable in uniform…(8) Where in the opinion of a constable the vehicle is apparently so defective that it ought not to be allowed to proceed without a test being carried out, he may require the test to be carried out forthwith…”

s.89 of the Police Act provides:

“(1) Any person who assaults a constable in the execution of his duty… shall be guilty of an offence…(2) Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty … shall be guilty of an offence…”

The Crown Court concluded in their judgement that:

“(1) the vehicle was on a road in that it was on Trafalgar Square which is a public place: the public had access to it, and other vehicles and members of the public were to be found there who had not obtained access either by overcoming a physical obstruction or in defiance of a prohibition express or implied; (2) the officer was entitled to demand the keys from the defendant under s.67 Road Traffic Act 1988 …”–then there is a finding in relation to the assault which I need not refer to–“(3) we considered that the defendant’s evidence that when he was at King’s Cross he received a telephone call from those in the vehicle ‘come quick they’ going to confiscate the van’ showed clearly that he went to Trafalgar Square determined to stop the van being confiscated or examined by any means and that is why and how the incident and the assault occurred.”

The Defendant appealed and the relevant questions for the court were:

“(1) Was the court entitled to find that for the purposes of s.67 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 that the vehicle was on a road when it was stationary in Trafalgar Square?… (2) Was the court right to find that Police Constable Brookfield was entitled to demand that the defendant give him the key to the vehicle in accordance with s.67 of the Road Traffic Act 1988? (3) Was the court entitled to conclude that the defendant wilfully obstructed Constable Brookfield in the execution of his duty?”

HELD:

The Appeal was dismissed. 

Tuckey LJ cited in his judgment the case of Griffin v. Squires [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1106.  In this case the court emphasised that the decision as to whether or not any particular place was a road was essentially one of fact for the justices (in this case for the Crown Court) and the Divisional Court would not interfere with any such, decision unless it could be shown that the court below had misdirected itself or there was no basis upon which the decision could be justified. Therefore the decision as to whether a particular place was a “road” for the purposes of the Road Traffic Act 1988 was essentially one of fact for the magistrates’ court or the Crown Court. The definition of a road as a definable way between two points, although helpful, was not exhaustive.  The concept in this case was that of a thoroughfare.  Trafalgar Square was where people went to and for the purpose, amongst others, of getting to train stations, this could rightly be characterised as a thoroughfare; and therefore the Crown Court had material before it on which it could conclude that the area of Trafalgar Square on which the defendant’s vehicle was standing was a “road”.

s.67 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 did not expressly contain a power to enable a police constable to ask for the keys to a vehicle but it did give a power to a police constable to stop a vehicle for a vehicle test to be carried out then and there, and to set in train arrangements for an examiner to attend and carry out the test.  The police constable had been faced with a position where the keys were about to be taken away and the test he had arranged might be frustrated; that given that the examiner, when he arrived, was specifically empowered to require the driver to comply with his instructions which included handing over the keys, the police constable did have the power, impliedly derived from and in aid of the general provisions of s.67, to do what was necessary to ensure that the test was carried out forthwith.  Accordingly, the police constable did have the necessary power in the circumstances to ask for the keys, and, in refusing, the defendant was obstructing the police constable in the course of his duty, under s.89 of the Police Act 1996.

Tuckey LJ answered ‘yes’ to the two questions and dismissed the appeal.  Tuckey LJ held that the officer did have the necessary power in the circumstance to ask for the keys and that in refusing, the defendant was obstructing him in the course of his duty. 

Moses J agreed with the judgment of Tuckey LJ.  Moses J added in his judgement that the police had to be careful about exercising their powers to ask for keys under s.67 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, other than on a road. 

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

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