FACTS:-

The First Defendant, Warbey, was the owner of a motor car, through which the accident was caused. He had lent the car to the Second Defendant, Knowles, and it was being driven at the accident by the Third Defendant, May. It was admitted that the accident had been caused by he negligence of Knowles and May, and interlocutory judgement had been signed against them, but they had no means of satisfying it. Warbey had insured against third party risks whilst the car was in his possession, but not whilst it was in the possession of uninsured persons, and neither Knowles or May was an insured person

The Claimant contended that Warbey was liable to him because he had permitted the use of the car without there being in force a policy against third party risks, contrary to section 33 of the Road Traffic 1930. Warbey said that the damage accruing from that breach of statutory duty was too remote to be recovered. He also said that the statute imposed a penalty for breach of the duty to insure and that that excluded the bringing of an action against him.

Justice Charles held that Warbey was liable to the Claimant on the ground (i) that he had committed a breach of a statutory duty in permitting the car to be used in the circumstances in which there was no sufficient policy of insurance within the meaning of section 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1930 and (ii) that the damage to the Claimant resulted from the breach of duty and was not too remote.

The First Defendant appealed the decision in the Court of Appeal before Greer, Maugham and Roche LJJ.

HELD:-

Lord Justice Greer agreed with every word of Justice Charles judgement however decided, having regard to the fact that other cases may be affected by this case, to add a few words.

Greer LJ addressed each of the defendant’s submissions in turn. Firstly, despite breaching section 35 (1), counsel for the defendant submitted that there exists no personal right for the injured person to claim damages for breach of the statute. According to Geer LJ this situation fell within the judgement of A L Smith LJ in Groves v Lord Wimborne (1) where be says ([1898] 2 QB at p 406)

“The Act in question [the Factory & Workshop Act 1878] … is not in the nature of a private legislative bargain between employers and workmen, as the learned judge seemed to think, but is a public Act passed in favours of the workers in factories and workshops to compel their employers to do certain things for their protection”

He then goes on to say;

“  Could it be doubted that if section 5 stood alone, and no fine was provided by the Act for contravention of its provisions, a person injured by a breach of the absolute and unqualified duty imposed by that section would have cause of action in respect of that breach? Clearly it could not be doubted. That being so, unless it appears from the whole “purview” of the Act, the language of Lord Cairns in the case of Atkinson v Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Co (4) that it was the intention of the legislature that the only remedy for breach of the statutory duty should be by proceeding for the fine imposed by section 82, it follows that, upon proof of a breach of that duty by the employer and injury thereby occasioned to the workman, a cause of action is established”

The effect of those observations by Smith LJ is that prima facie, if a person be damaged by the breach of a statute he had a right to recover damages from the person who has broken the provisions of the statute, unless it can be established by looking at the whole of the Act that it was not intended that he should have such a right. I think that so far from it being established in the present case form the whole purpose of the Road Traffic Act 1930, that it was not intended that a person in the position of the claimant should have such a right, it is, on the contrary, established that it was intended that he should have this right, because it is clear that the statute was intended for his protection.

Geer LJ stated what you have to consider is whether, taking the whole Act together, it showed that the injured person was outside its purview. He was satisfied that, as the law stood at the present day, a cause of action does exist in the case of persons who have suffered damage by reason of a breach of section 35 (1) of Road Traffic Act 1930.

He addressed the Defendant’s other two submissions quickly. Firstly, that damages were too remote. According to Geer LJ assuming that the section gives a right of action to a person injured, that the damages in this case are the very thing by which it was intended to protect the injured person, because the damage which he suffered by reason of the non-compliance with section 35 (1) is that he had got a defendant a person who cannot pay, who is uninsured, and as against whom he has not got the right given by the earlier statute.

Secondly, that the action was premature. This involved the consideration whether quantification of the damage is an essential part of the cause of action. Geer LJ stated that the cause of action is complete if a provision of the statute has been broken and damage occasioned to the claimant, and that can be proved in any way in which the courts of law are accustomed to have questions of damage proved.

He dismissed the appeal.

Lord Justice Maugham agreed with Greer LJ however discussed further the question as to whether the Road Traffic Act 1930 gives rise to an action by a third party for damages for breach of statutory obligation imposed on the owner of the motor vehicle by section 35.

Maugham LJ drew particular attention to Atkins LJ judgement ([1928] 2KB at p 841) in Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co, Ltd (2);

“The question [whether the intention of the Act is to give a private remedy or to exclude it] is not to be solved by considering whether or not the person aggrieved can bring himself within some special class of he community or whether he is some designated individual” [he adds] “the duty may be such paramount importance that it owed to all the public”

From looking at all the authorities he decided that there are two considerations in determining whether the intention of the statute precludes a private remedy. The first point is that you have to make up your mind whether the harm which has been sought to be remedied by the statutory provision which is alleged to have been broken is one of a kind which the statute was intended to protect. 

The other consideration which he thought strongly supported the view that the statute was not intended to preclude a personal action os that the action is brought by a person who is pointed at on the fair construction of the statute as being a person whom the legislature desired to protect.

Maugham LJ concluded that this is a case where there is nothing in the Act to show that a personal action is precluded by reason of the special remedy, and, further, that upon the true construction of the Act there is sufficient ground for coming top the conclusion that the section was passed fo the purposes of giving remedy to those third party users of the road who might otherwise suffer injury by the negligence of drivers without having any pecuniary remedy which was of any avail.

Lord Justice Roche agreed.

No related posts.