FACTS:-

This is an appeal from a case stated by Justices for the county of Lancaster acting in and for the sessional divison of Flyde.

On 24^th August 1966 a collision occurred on Lytham Road, Freckleton, between a Morris and a Volkswagen which was then in the act of overtaking the Morris. The collision was caused by the action of a motor lorry travelling in the opposite direction which pulled out in the centre lane of a three land road into the path of the Volkswagen causing that car to take evasive action and thus collide with the Morris.

The collision was witnessed by an independent witness (Mr Dickinson) who was travelling behind the lorry and that this witness took the registered number which he reported to the police.

On September 3^rd 1966 the Defendant was interviewed by the police and admitted verbally driving a motor lorry EWH 820 at the material time and place and further that he made a voluntary statement under caution to this effect. The Defendant emphatically denied that he had ever been involved in any accident at all or that his driving could have given rise to the accident in question.

It was submitted on behalf of the Defendant that there was no case to answer.  It was contended that no evidence had been adduced to show that the Defendant was the driver of a lorry involved in the accident and secondly that the lorry EWH 820 was the lorry concerned in the accident.

The Justices were of the opinion that the evidence of Mr Dickinson amply established the presence of a lorry at the scene at the material time and that the Defendant’s admission to the police and his statement showed that he was the driver of the motor lorry at the material time and place. The only point of difficulty was whether the fact that Mr Dickinson could not quote the number of the lorry to them some two and a half months later was such a hiatus in the evidence as to be fatal to the prosecution. They considered that it was not unreasonable that a witness should fail to remember a registered number after such a period, particularly when he had communicated that number immediately afterwards to the police. The police could not, by reason of the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, state before them that “ Mr Dickinson told me the registration number of the lorry was…” justices considered the effects of Grew v Cubbit (1951) 49 LGR 650.

The Justices charged the Defendant with the unlawful driving of a motor lorry without due care and attention contrary to section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1960. He was imposed with a fine of £10 with £5 2s 6d costs and endorsement of his driving licence.

The Defendant appealed the decision in the Queen’s Bench Division before Chief Justice Lord Parker, Lord Justice Diplock and Justice Widgery.

HELD:-

All three judges reluctantly ruled in favour of the Defendant, thus quashing the conviction of first instance.  Both Lord Parker and Diplock held there was no admissible evidence identifying the lorry of the number EWH 820 as the lorry involved in the accident, and any evidence of the police constable as to the number of the lorry involved in the accident was hearsay.

Lord Parker sympathised with the Justices, whom accepted the common sense approach namely that they were entitled to come to the conclusion that the police constable acted on the information given by Mr Dickinson and that Mr Dickinson must have identified the lorry as EWH 820. However, he dismissed that approach, stating to do so would undermine the principles under which we still act, that hearsay evidence is inadmissible

He drew attention to Grew v Cubit. There the independent witness had not given a number to the police, but he gave evidence that he had got his wife to write it down. Again as a result of the information received the police constable went and interviewed the defendant. The court held, although there was a strong probability that the police officer acted on the information obtained from the wife or from the wife’s note, there was in fact under our rules of evidence, no connecting link, and the prosecution had not proved their case.

Lord Parker concluded that if Mr Dickinson had been able to say that he gave a number to the police officer, that he saw the police officer write it down in his note book and had then been asked to refresh his memory from the production of that note book, then albeit it was not in his own handwriting, it was effect his note and the prosecution could have proved their case. In my judgement there was no evidence on which the justices were entitled to convict, and I would allow this appeal.

Lord Justice Diplock agreed with Lord Parker and added that the inference that the appellant was the driver of the lorry was really an inference of what the independent witness had said to the police when he gave them the number of the lorry, and since what he had said to the police would have been inadmissible as hearsay, to infer what he said to the police is inadmissible

It is important to note that Lord Justice Diplock declared that this case illustrated the need to reform the law of evidence, in order to overcome the difficulties of the case.

Related posts:

1. Ahmed v DPP 1998
2. Griffin v Squires [1958]