Hatton v Cooper [2001]

FACTS:

The claimant, H, and the defendant, C, were each driving cars in opposite directions on a road with a gentle bend. The front off-sides of the vehicles came into contact with each other. Both vehicles were badly damaged by the collision and both H and C suffered injuries as a result of which neither had any recollection of the impact. There had been no eye witnesses.

H claimed damages on the basis that the accident was caused wholly by the negligence of C. C denied negligence and counterclaimed on the basis that H had been responsible for the accident, although at trial C contended that the correct inference for the court to draw from the evidence that was available was that each party was equally to blame. The judge found that the accident had been caused by a sudden, unplanned change of direction and accepted the evidence of H’s employer that H was a careful driver who would not cut a corner. The judge therefore concluded that the sudden change of direction had to have been made by C and accordingly found her wholly to blame for the accident. 

C appealed against that decision on the ground that the judge had been in error. She contended that the proper inference from the available evidence was that each party was equally to blame for the accident and that there had been no evidential basis for the judge’s finding that she was solely to blame. She further challenged the judge’s reliance on evidence from H’s employer to the effect that H was not the kind of driver who would cut a corner.

HELD:

The appeal was allowed.

In order to determine the liability for a collision between two vehicles in circumstances where the evidence was equivocal as to whether one or other driver, or both, might have been to blame, the reasonable and probable inference to draw was that both parties were equally to blame. In the instant case, the judge’s finding that it was C, rather than H, who was wholly responsible for the collision had been based substantially, if not entirely, on his acceptance of the evidence of H’s employer to the effect that H was a careful driver who would not cut a corner.

I was found that the judge had been in error in attaching any significant weight to that evidence as every driver was a careful driver unless and until he made a careless mistake. In the context of the collision that had occurred in the instant case, the opinion of a third party as to the driving ability of either party was completely worthless. The judge’s finding on liability was therefore fundamentally flawed by his reliance on the evidence of H’s employer. 

Lord Justice Pill held that the Judge was correct to reject, on the balance of probabilities, the suggestion that both of them behaved in a near suicidal way.  Lord Justice Pill found that on the evidence it was far more likely that a sudden change of direction by one of the vehicles occurred and occurred to late for the other to take evasive action. 

The decision as to which of the vehicles deviated depended on a finding as to the side of the road on which the impact occurred.  Lord Justice Pill found that the findings in relation to the debris and ultimate position of the vehicles were sufficient to justify the finding of the Judge that the impact occurred on the claimant’s side of the road and that only the defendant was negligent.  Lord Justice Pill did not consider that the Judges opinion should be invalidated by the finding that by reason of the employers evidence he did not accept that the claimant would have been cutting the corner.  Lord Justice Pill concluded that the Court had been rightly warned of the dangers of relying on parts only of a judgment which is alleged to have contained flaws.  Lord Justice Pill acknowledged this danger and but also considered the risk of wrongly reversing a judgment and held that the Judges conclusion was justified on the evidence and dismissed the appeal.  

Lord Justice Johnathan Parker found that there was no sufficient evidential basis for the Judge’s conclusion that one party or the other was wholly responsible for the accident.  The only reasonable and proper inference was that each party was partly responsible.  He found that since the evidence does not able to the court to apportion the blame between them, it follows the authority of Baker v Wallace that they must be held equally responsible.  Lord Justice Johnathan Parker allowed the appeal. 

Elizabeth Butler Sloss, P, found that the claimant failed to prove his case and in the absence of the concession by the defendant, the claim would not have succeeded.  Thus a conclusion based upon the decision in Baker v Wallace [1953] 1 WLR 1470 was not necessary on this appeal.  Elizabeth Butler Sloss agreed with Lord Justice Johnathan Parker that Baker v Wallace should not be taken as rigid authority and allowed the appeal.

Related posts:

1. Hatton v Cooper [2001]
2. Howard v Bemrose [1973]
3. Baker v Market Harborough Industrial Cooperative Society [1953]
4. Thomas v Hooper; Thomas v Cooper [1986]