Harrison v Hill [1932]

  • Reported: [1932] J.C. 13; [1931] S.L.T. 598, HCJ
  • Court: High Court

FACTS:-

The driver of a motor vehicle was convicted of an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 s. 7(4) on the ground that, while disqualified for holding a driving licence, he had driven his vehicle on a road forming the access from a public highway to a farm. The road in question was part of the farm and led only to the farmhouse, where it terminated.  It had no other houses upon it and it was not maintained by any public authority but was maintained by the farm tenant in terms of his lease. There was no gate at the entrance to it, and no intimation that it was not open to the public.  Except at times in summer when the farmer placed a pole across it to prevent the straying of cattle which were grazing in the adjoining fields, otherwise there was no obstacle to prevent the public having access to it. The road was used by the public as an access to the farm, and members of the public not having business there also frequently walked on it. They had, on several occasions, been turned off by the farmer when there were growing crops in the adjoining fields.

The Road Traffic Act s.7(4) renders liable to certain penalties any person who, while disqualified under the provisions of Part 1 of the Act for holding a driving licence, drives a motor vehicle on a “road.”   s.121(1) of the Act defines “road” as “any highway and any other road to which the public has access …”

The Judge at First Instance held the road was a road under the Road Traffic Act 1930, where the public had access under s.121 and the Defendant was convicted.

The Defendant appealed

HELD:-

On appeal the road was a road to which the public had access within the meaning of s.121(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1930, the conviction was sustained.

The question of law for the High Court was whether the road was a road to which the Road Traffic Act 1930 applies and was it correct to convict the appellant?

Lord Justice Clyde stated in his judgement that the question for the decision comes to be whether the road is one ‘to which public have access’ within the meaning of the definition of s.121 of the Act.  Lord Justice Clyde held that the class of road intended is wider than the class of public roads to which the public has access in virtue of a positive right belonging to the public, and flowing either from statute or from prescriptive user. A road may therefore be within the definition although it belongs to the class of private roads, and although all that can be said with regard to its availability to the public is that the public “has access” to it.

Lord Justice Clyde further found that when the statute speaks of “the public” in this connexion, what is meant is the public generally, and not the special class of members of the public who have occasion for business or social purposes to go to the farmhouse or to any part of the farm itself; were it otherwise, the definition might just as well have included all private roads as well as all public highways.  Lord Justice Clyde concluded that at the time when the offences were alleged to have been committed, the public did generally have access to the road and found the answers to the two questions should have been put in the affirmative.

Lord Sands stated that the object of the special legislation with regard to certain prosecutions and offences was the protection of the public.  This explains why the prohibition in this case was dealt with the fact it was not limited to public highways but was extended to any road where the public have access.  Lord Sands made clear in his judgement it was for the public to be protected.  Lord Sands held in his judgement that any road may be regarded as a road to which the public have access upon which members of the public are to be found ho have not obtained access by overcoming a physical obstruction or in defiance of prohibition express or implied.

Lord Blackburn agreed and held that the definition of a road under s.121 was wide enough to cover the road in this case and that the conviction was justified. 

Related posts:

  1. Bugge v Taylor 1941
  2. R v Beaumont [1964]
  3. Griffin v Squires [1958]
  4. Thomas v Dando [1951]
  5. Purves v Muir [1948]

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