Harrington and Another v Link Motor Policies at Lloyd’s;Sub Nom. Harrington v Pinkey [1989]
- Reported: [1989] 2 LLOYDS REP. 310;[1989] R.T.R. 345, CA
- Year: 1989
- Court: Court of Appeal
FACTS:
There had been a traffic accident on October 24, 1985, which was not serious. After the accident the Claimants had consulted solicitors and they had communicated with the insurers.
On November 6, 1985 the solicitors had written setting out the fact that they were instructed on behalf of the Claimants and the date of the accident, and enclosing a copy of their letter to the insurer.
On November 19 the solicitors had written saying that they awaited hearing from the insurers as soon as they had the opportunity of investigating the matter on behalf of their insured. That had not produced a response, and the solicitors had written on December 13 indicating that a reply would be welcome.
On January 2, 1986 the solicitors wrote a letter which stated;
“it seems to us that liability cannot be in issue in this matter and unless, therefore, you are able to confirm to us within the next fourteen days that an accident report has been received and that you will be dealing with the matter on a full liability basis, we will advise our client to institute proceedings against your insured without further reference to you”
In June 1986 proceedings had been issued in Worksop County Court against the insured. He had taken no part and in due course the Claimant’s solicitors had entered a default judgement, and had asked the insurers to meet that judgement in accordance with the 1972 Act.
It had been accepted by the judge that the letter was sufficient to amount to the notice required by section 149 (2) of the Road Traffic Act 1972.
The Defendant, Link Motor Policies at Lloyd’s, appealed the decision on the ground that the letter did not in fact comply with section 149 because it gave notice that the solicitors were going to advise their clients to institute proceedings and did not state they would do so. The letter also lacked indication of the court which the proceedings were to be commenced and the approximate time.
The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal before Lord Justice Woolf and Sir Denys Buckley.
HELD:
The real issue in the case was whether the letter of January 2 was sufficient to comply with section 149 of the 1972 Road Traffic Act.
Section 149 provides;
“(1) If, after a certificate of insurance … has been delivered under section 147 of this Act to the person by whom a policy has been effected … judgment … is obtained against any person who is insured by the policy … (the insurer) shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person … entitled to the benefit of the judgment any sum payable thereunder…
“(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under the foregoing provisions of this section (a) in respect of any judgment, unless before or within seven days after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment was given, the insurer had notice of the proceedings;…”
Lord Justice Woolf relied heavily on the decision of the Privy Council in Ceylon motor Insurance Association Ltd v Thambugala (1953) AC 584. He was not prepared to differ from the conclusion that the court in which the proceedings would be taken need to be specified, or the date.
The letter in the present case was distinguishable from the letter in the Ceylon case. It was not possible to regard it as notice for the purposes of the1972 Act. It did not do what was required by the section, which was to give notice of the proceedings.
Lord Woolf had no choice but to allow the appeal.
Sir Denys Buckley agreed with the judgement of Lord Justice Woolf
Related posts:
