Griffin v Squires [1958]
- Reported: [1958] 3 All ER 468
- Year: 1958
- Court: Queen's Bench Division
FACTS:-
The Respondent, with the owners’ consent, drove a motor vehicle that was parked in a car park for some 10 yards. During that time, the car went through a hedge and came to rest on the lawn of a building adjoining the car park. The Respondent neither held a driving licence nor was insured against third-party risks, contrary to s 4(1) and s 35 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. The car park was owned by the local authority and was open to all members of the public at all times for parking cars without payment. At the north-west corner of the car park there was an opening of about fifteen feet adjoining a private footpath which lead to a bowling club and to allotment gardens. The footpath was routinely used by members of the club and allotment holders, who had to cross the car park to reach the path, but it was not habitually used by the general public. The Respondent neither held a driving licence nor was insured against third-party risks.
The Respondent was charged with committing offences under s 4(1) and s 35 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, which make it an offence to drive a motor vehicle without a licence, and to use a vehicle while uninsured, “on a road”.
Held (at first instance):- Section 121 of the Act of 1930 defines road as meaning “any highway and any other road to which the public has access”. Accordingly, the justices held that neither the car park as part of the private footpath, nor the car park itself, was a road within the meaning of the Act and dismissed the charges against the respondent.
On appeal by the Prosecutor:
HELD:-
The Justices were of the opinion that, although the private footpath was a road, it was not one to which the public had access, other than the members of the bowling club and the allotment holders. The Justices also found that the car park was not a road within the 1930 Act because, while the public had access to it, it was not “a line of communication between places for the use of foot passengers, riders and vehicles” which was the definition of “road” in the Oxford Dictionary.
Lord Parker CJ stated that he entirely agreed with the justices having found that the general public did not habitually use the car park, and that the footpath to the bowling green and the council allotments was only used by club members and the allotment holders. Accordingly, he also came to the conclusion that it is impossible to say that this car park, as a part of this footpath leading to the bowling green, was a road. Lord Parker CJ then cited the Lord Justice General Lord Clyde in his interpretation of what “road” means in the case of Harrison v Hill (1932 SC (J) 13), a case in Scotland, which found that, as is quite clear, “road” means something other than a highway; in other words it is intended to include a wider class of road, and the Lord Justice General Lord Clyde clarified that when the statute speaks of ‘the public’ in this connexion, what is meant is the public generally, and not the special class of members of the public who have occasion for business or social purposes to peruse the aforementioned “road”.
The second question that Lord Parker CJ look at was whether the car park itself was a “road” within the definition. Lord Parker CJ found that the car park was certainly a place which the general public had access to and habitually used. Lord Justice Parker referred to the case of Heath v Pearson ([1957] Criminal Law Review 195 and stated that in Heath v Pearson the yard that was in question, Brunswick Yard, might well be a place to which the public had access, but that it was held that this was not enough to bring it within the definition of “road” in the Act for it also had to be a road. The justices in Heath v Pearson had found that Brunswick Yard was not a road and, since the question whether or not a place was a road was primarily a question of fact, the court had no right, even if they had not agreed with it, to interfere with the justices’ decision. Agreeing with the decision in Heath v Pearson, Lord Justice Parker CJ found that it was for the justices to decide as a question of fact whether this car park in the ordinary sense could be treated as a road. Lord Justice Parker found that there was evidence on which the justices could come to that conclusion and stated that it was eminently a matter for them. Accordingly, he dismissed the appeal.
Streatfeild J. agreed with Lord Justice Parker CJ, however, he did so with some hesitance. Streatfeild J pointed out that s.15(1) of the Act the words “or other public place” are wide enough to embrace a car park such as what has been described in this case. Streatfield J stated that if it had been simply “on a road” it may be that a public car park would not be embraced by the word “road”, but pointed out that in s 15(1) there is that distinction between a road and another public place. However, Streatfeild J pointed out that under this particular section, s 4, the word is simply “road” and nothing else, and so in interpreting the word “road” in accordance with its definition in s 121 he reluctantly come to the conclusion that it was open to the justices to find that this public car park was not a road. For that reason he too agreed that this appeal must fail.
Diplock J. also agreed that this appeal should be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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