FACTS:-

The Defendant was the owner of a motor car which was standing parked outside his house. From the date of purchase until the middle of January 1959 the Defendant had an insurance policy in relation to his use of the car, in relation to Part 2 of the 1930 Act. The vehicle broke down on the 20^th December 1958 and could not be driven.

Immediately after the break down the Defendant decided to lay the car up outside his house. It remained there on the road until 7 February 1959, jacked-up, with its wheels off the ground and with its battery removed. The Defendant clearly intended to use the car when it suited his purpose. In the middle of January, 1959, he caused his insurance policy to be suspended, intending to make it effective again as soon as he had put the car into running order again. On 7 February 1959, he had been working on the car and had cleaned it, oiled its locks and lowered it to the ground, sent its batteries away to be recharged, removed the broken carburettor and replaced it with a new one. He also examined the self-starter, and found that it solenoid needed renewing. On that date, the car could not be mechanically propelled because its engine could not work and the petrol in its tank had evaporated. The Defendant had no intention of driving the car on that date or of moving it from its position on the roadway.

Another car collided with the Defendant’s car on 7 February 1959. When required by the police to produce his certificate of insurance, the Defendant was unable to do so and stated that he had sent the insurance back saying he had laid the vehicle up from December, 1958.

He was subsequently charged under the Road Traffic Act, 1930, section 35(1)a, with using a motor car on a road on 7 February 1959, without there being in force in relation to the user an insurance policy in respect of third-party risks complying with the requirements of Part 2 of the Act.

It was contended by the Defendant that the car was not being used by him on 7 February 1959, because

(i)                 user of a motor vehicle did not include putting it on a road and maintaining it in one position in a condition in which, physically, that vehicle could not be driven and was not available for use as a motor vehicle;

(ii)               a motor vehicle was not a being used when in a garage;

(iii)             if a motor vehicle was immobilised and in a yard and was pushed into the street to be taken away as scrap, it could not be said to be being used; and

(iv)              the legislation used careful words: e.g., in the offence of causing a motor car to stand on the road without the necessary lights, the word “cause” was used and not the word “use”; and that the word “cause” would cover a laid-up vehicle, whereas the word “use” would be inappropriate.

It was contended for the respondent (among other contentions):

a)     that the purpose of section 35 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, was to ensure that, when a motor vehicle was on the road, there should be proper cover against such third-party risks as might occur in consequence of the vehicle being on the road;

b)     that throughout the Act the word “drive” was constantly used in connection with offences involving driving, whereas in section 35 the word “use” was used, and it was obviously intended to cover a motor vehicle both when it was being driven and when it was not being driven on the road;

c)      that a motor vehicle left standing could run away and cause injury or damage to a third party; that a stationary vehicle could give rise to a liability for injury to a third party; and that a vehicle which was stationary on a road could be used to keep property in.

In first instance the Justices came to the conclusion that, despite the vehicle standing on the side of the road and not being driven, it could be said to being used for the purposes of section 35 (1). The Defendant now appeals his conviction in the Queens Bench Division.

HELD:-

The main issue in this appeal was what is meant by the words “use…a motor vehicle on a road” within the meaning of section 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1930. Section 35 (1) provides;

“It shall not be lawful for any person to use, or to cause or permit any other person to use, a motor vehicle on a road unless there is in force in relation to the user of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as may be, such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks”

Both Chief Justice Lord Parker and Justice Cassels agreed that, although the car could not be driven, it could be moved and therefore the owner had the use of it on a road within the meaning of section 35(1).

Lord Parker claimed that there is a contradistinction between the word “use” and “drive” and prima facie “use” is a wider term and includes something more than driving and, it certainly would include moving

The words “to use … a motor vehicle on a road”, in section 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, meant “to have the use of a motor vehicle on a road”, and, as the car could be moved on 7 February 1959, even though it could not be driven, the Defendant had the use of it on a road, within the meaning of section 35(1).

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