R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board EX P. M (A Minor); R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board EX. P. Keane [2000]
- Reported: [2000] R.T.R. 21; [1999] P.I.Q.R. Q195, CA; AFFIRMING [1998] P/I.Q.R P107; [1998] C.O.D. 128. QBD
- Year: 2000
- Court: Court of Appeal
FACTS:
On 25th August 1992 the applicant, then aged 10 was walking along an access track to a sewerage works in Stanley in County Durham. The applicant was struck and as a result had serious head injuries from a motorcycle ridden by Malcolm Brown. Brown was subsequently convicted of dangerous driving in respect of the accident and of driving whilst uninsured.
The Motor Insurers’ Bureau, to whom a claim was made on the applicant’s behalf for compensation under the Motor Insurers’ Bureau Agreement, rejected the claim because the accident did not occur on a road and therefore was not within the Agreement. On 7th May 1993 the applicant’s then next friend applied on his behalf to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation under paragraph 4 of its 1990 scheme for “personal injury directly attributable–(a) to a crime of violence …”
The applicant requested a hearing before the Board under the provisions of the scheme. A panel of the Board heard evidence, which they accepted, that Brown had not deliberately driven at the applicant and therefore rejected the application because they ruled it was excluded from the scheme by paragraph 11 , which read:
“Applications for compensation for personal injury attributable to traffic offences will be excluded from the scheme, except where such injury is due to a deliberate attempt to run the victim *24 down.” That provision had been present in that form in previous editions of the scheme since at least 1979.”
By a letter of 11th January 1994 the Board informed the applicant’s solicitors that a member of the Board had disallowed the application because, in the words of the letter, he was “not satisfied that the applicant suffered personal injury directly attributable to a crime of violence”.
The applicant sought judicial review contending that para.11 of the 1990 Scheme should be construed in a broader purposive way, having regard to the history of the 1990 Scheme in which similar claims had been allowed. The Applicant was unsuccessful at first instance and appealed to the Court of Appeal.
HELD:
It was held that the words of the exclusion in paragraph 11 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (1990) were broad and clear. That was referring to traffic offences without qualification according to where caused or whether compensation was otherwise recoverable.
Auld LJ dismissed the appeal. Paragraph 11 was clear and a purposive construction was adopted, it could not be held that the applicant’s injuries were not attributable to a traffic offence. Auld despite the inconsistencies with the Board in the past the appeal should be dismissed.
Clarke LJ found that the Applicant will not be compensated as is application was clearly excluded under paragraph 11. Morritt LJ agreed with the reasons Auld LJ gave and dismissed the judgment.
The appeal was dismissed.
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