Conti v Hugh James (A Firm) (2003)
- Reported: (2003) APIL PI Focus Vol 14 Issue 4
- Year: 2003
FACTS:-
In July 1993, the Claimant suffered severe head injuries when riding a motorcycle, which slid and fell to the ground on the Hendon Way in London. In February 1994, the Claimant retained the Defendant firm to act for him in a claim for damages for personal injuries. The Defendant firm obtained a witness statement made by a police vehicle examiner at the time of the accident. That statement indicated that there were defects in the motorcycle’s rear tyre, which would render the vehicle extremely dangerous in wet weather. However this was doubted by a consultant engineer instructed by the Defendant. There was also a police accident report, which revealed that the accident was preceded in lane two of three lanes by a large petrol or diesel slick.
The consultant engineer concluded that the likely cause of the accident was the presence of a large slick of petrol/diesel in the highway, which had only been present for a short time. Consequently the Defendant firm advised their client that it would not be possible to blame the accident on the condition of the rear tyre, and it was unlikely that a claim against the Highway Authority would succeed given that the slick had only been present for a short time.
The Defendant wrote to the Claimant on the 3rd October 1994 advising him accordingly. They followed up this letter with another letter dated 29th March 1995.
On the 22nd March 2002, there was a chance conversation with a judge at a dinner party which revealed the existence of the MIB Untraced Drivers Agreement. The Claimant instructed new solicitors who issued proceedings against the Defendant on the 8th July 2002. The case came before Morland J.
HELD:-
Justice Morland said that the Defendant’s advice was not in itself negligent, but it failed to take account of the existence of the MIB Agreement. Such an application should have been brought by the 15th July 1996.
The Defendant’s counsel tried to argue that the claim was statute barred because the cause of action accrued at the latest on receipt of the second letter of the 29th March 1995. That was when in reality, the Claimant lost his right to make a claim. The Claimant’s counsel submitted that the Claimant was not locked in by the negligence of his solicitors.
Morland J said that the Claimant had sustained no quantifiable losses at the time of the letter dated 29th March 1995. The Claimant could not have abandoned something that he did not know about (the possibility of an application to the MIB) and the Claimant did not suffer any real damage until the application to the MIB was barred by the three year time limit (15th July 1996).
Judgment was given for the Claimant with leave to appeal refused.
Liability remained disputed and a trial on liability and quantum was listed for January 2004. Three days before trial, an out of court settlement was accepted by the Claimant, damages, costs and interest exceeding £1 million.
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