Cambridge v Motors Insurance Bureau; Sub Nom. Cambridge v Callaghan 1998
- Reported: [1998] R.T.R. 365; THE TIMES, MARCH 21, 1997, CA
- Court: Court of Appeal
FACTS:
The Claimant was injured in a road traffic accident which occurred on 19 August 1991. The Claimant was knocked from his moped by a motor vehicle driven by the first Defendant, Peter Callaghan. Mr Callaghan was not insured. Under the terms of the agreement between M.I.B. and the Secretary of State for Transport dated 21 December1988 by which M.I.B. agreed to meet the liability of uninsured drivers, there are condition precedents to M.I.B.’s liability contained in clause 5(1) of the agreement.
Clause 2(1) of the Motor Insurers Bureau (Compensation of Victims of Uninsured Drivers) Agreement provides:
“If judgement in respect of any … liability is obtained against any person … whether or not any such a person … be in fact covered by a contract of insurance and any such judgement is not satisfied in full within seven days from the date upon which the person … in whose favour the judgement was given became entitled to enforce it then MIB will … pay … to the person … in whose favour the judgement was given any sum payable … thereunder…”
Clause 5 provides:
“(1) MIB shall not incur any liability under this agreement unless (a) notice in writing of the bringing of proceedings is given within seven days after the commencement of the proceedings (i) to MIB … (ii) such notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the writ, summons or document initiating the proceedings…”
The Claimant’s solicitors, in reliance on clauses 2 and 5 of the Department of Transport Motor Insurers’ Bureau (Compensation of Victims of Uninsured Drivers) Agreement 31 December 1988 sent a letter informing the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of County Court proceedings which were commenced against the car driver for damages for personal injuries. The MIB failed to recognise the notice as sufficient notice of instigation of proceedings and refused to accept liability under the agreement of 1988.
The Claimant’s claim against M.I.B. came before the district judge who dismissed it on the ground that the Claimant had not met the condition precedent to a successful claim under clauses 2 and 5 of the Agreement of 1988. An appeal by the Claimant to the County Court was successful.
The MIB appealed.
HELD:
The appeal was dismissed. The direction in clause 5(1)(a)(ii) of the Agreement of 1988 requiring the notice of the bringing of proceedings to be supported by accompanying documentation was a mandatory part of a condition precedent to the MIB’s liability of which the main purpose was to provide MIB not only with notice that proceedings had been initiated, but with official evidence that proceedings had been issued, and of the date when, and the court where, they had been issued; that might be achieved by supplying MIB with a copy of a stamped High Court writ, or of a stamped county court summons, or of a copy of a county court’s notice of issue of default summons and that it was not necessary to provide a copy of the summons itself; and consequently, the Claimant complied with the condition precedent.
Millet L.J held that it would be absurd to read the condition as requiring a copy of the stamped summons itself to be provided rather than the official evidence of the issue of the summons which is provided by the notice of issue of default summons. Millet agreed with the counsel for the MIB that the condition is mandatory but held that it was not essential to serve a copy of the officially stamped writ or summons itself. What was essential was that the MIB should be supplied with either a stamped copy of the writ or summons or with official evidence that it has been issued. Thus Millet L.J found the letter of 15 July 1994 complied with the requirement and dismissed the appeal.
Mance, J agreed with the judgement of Millett. Mance added that the requirement of the last sentence of Clause 5(1)(a) of the Agreement of 1988 is mandatory, but its terms contain some flexibility with regard to the document to be provided, and both the short term limit in and natural purpose of Clause 5(1)(a) are reasons for not reading the reference to an ‘other document initiating the proceedings’ too restrictively. Mance found that applying this to the case, clause 5(1)(a) could be and was thus performed appropriately by the provision of a copy of the plaint note.
Kennedy LJ agreed with the judgement that the words at the end of clause 5(1)(a) of the MIB Agreement did form part of the condition precedent and were mandatory in that they required a document to be sent to the MIB in addition to the notice in writing of the bringing of the proceedings. The purpose of the requirement was to provide the MIB with official proof of the issue of proceedings and therefore a notice of issue or a copy of an unstamped writ was not enough.
The appeal was dismissed. Cross-appeal was allowed with costs and leave to appeal was refused.
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