FACTS:-

The Defendant drove a mechanically propelled vehicle known as a Go-Kart on a road. The Go-Kart had its engine at the rear, had a tubular frame mounted on four small wheels and was equipped with a single seat, steering-wheel and column, and an efficient silencer. It had brakes which operated on the rear wheels only, and it had no horn, springs, parking-brake, driving-mirror or wings. The Go-Kart was not constructed or adapted to carry passengers other than the driver or a load.

The evidence was that the Defendant had used the Go-Kart on the road on one occasion only, and there was no evidence that other people used Go-Karts on the road. Nevertheless, the Defendant was convicted of certain offences under the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1955 and the Road Traffic Act 1960.

It was contended on behalf of the Defendant that the Go-Kart was not constructed, intended or adapted for use on roads to which the public had access, but was constructed and intended to be used for sporting purposes on private property. It was not a motor vehicle or a motor car within section 253 of the Road Traffic Act 1960.

It was contended on behalf of the Claimant that the Go-Kart was a motor vehicle, namely, a motor car within section 253 of the Act of 1960.

The Justices found in favour of the Claimant finding all the charges proved. The Defendant appeals the first instant decision in the Queens Bench Division.

HELD:-

Chief Justice Lord Parker ruled in favour of the Defendant and quashed all convictions because there was insufficient evidence before the Justices to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a reasonable person looking at the Go-Kart would say that one of its uses would be use on the road, nor that it was fit or apt for use on the road although it was capable of such use.

The real issue in the case was whether the Go-Kart was a motor vehicle within the meaning of section 253(1) Road Traffic Act  1960;

“motor vehicle” means mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads

The words “intended or adapted for use on roads” appear in the Act in connection “constructed or adapted for” and this gave rise to trouble.

The court referred to Daley v Hargreaves [1961] 1 All ER 552, a case which came to the conclusion that mechanically propelled dumpers used in construction works did not come within the words “intended or adapted for use on the roads” and, therefore were not motor vehicles. Justice Salmon said at p556:

“Intended…for use on roads” may mean no more than suitable or apt for use. I prefer, however, to express no concluded view on this point but to base my decision, following MacDonald v Carmichael, on the ground that in no event does the evidence of very limited user in this case establish that the vehicles were intended for use on roads within the meaning of the statute”

Lord Parker determined that the correct test in determining whether a vehicle was “intended or adapted for use on roads” in section 253(1) of the Road Traffice Act 1960 was that of the reasonable man. The test of being “intended” is whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its users would be a road user. Lord Parker said (at page 440):

“Thus, in the ordinary case, it seems to me that there will be little difficulty in saying whether a particular vehicle is a motor vehicle or not. But to define exactly the meaning of the words ‘intended or adapted’ is by no means easy. For my part, I think that the expression ‘intended’, to take that word first, does not mean ‘intended by the user of the vehicle either at the moment of the alleged offence or for the future’. I do not think that it means the intention of the manufacturer or the wholesaler or the retailer; and it may be, as Salmon J said in Daley v Hargreaves, that it is not referring to the intention as such of any particular purpose. Salmon J. suggested that the word ‘intended’ might be paraphrased as ’suitable or apt’. It may be merely a difference of wording, but I prefer to make the test whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its users would be a road user.

In deciding that question, the reasonable man would not, as I conceive, have to envisage what some man losing his senses would do with a vehicle; nor an isolated user or a user in an emergency. The real question is: Is some general use on the roads contemplated as one of the users? Approaching the matter in that way, at the end of the case the Justices would have to ask themselves: has it been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable person looking at the Go-Kart would say that one of its uses would be a use on the road?”.

Related posts:

1. Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset v Fleming 1987
2. Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington [2001]
3. Daley and Others v Hargreaves 1961