Bugge v Taylor 1941

FACTS:-

During the hours of darkness a motor vehicle under the control of the Appellant was left unlighted on the forecourt of a hotel. The forecourt, which was the private property of the owners of the hotel and was about 69 feet long and about 10 feet wide at one end and 20 feet wide at the other, was bounded on one side by an island public pavement, but was open to the highway at both ends.

There was and had been no wall or other obstruction to prevent the public, either on foot or in vehicles, going over the forecourt, or to separate it from the highway, nor had there been any restriction on the movements on foot over the forecourt of the public who had, without let or hindrance, used the forecourt in every direction, not only to reach the hotel, but also to shorten the distance when walking from the main highway to another highway which joined the main highway at the point where the hotel was situated. On occasion public service and other vehicles had been over and through the forecourt

HELD:-

The justices came to the conclusion that the forecourt was a road to which the public had access within s. 1, sub-s. 1, and s. 15 of the Road Transport Lighting Act, 1927, and they convicted the appellant of the offence charged against him.

Lord Caldecote CJ stated in his judgement that the question for the decision in the case was whether the forecourt of the hotel was a “road” within s. 1(1) of the Road Transport Lightening Act 1927, and whether the appellant’s motor car was “on a road … during the hours of darkness” within the meaning of the 1927 Act without carrying the lamps required.

Caldecote CJ referred to the case of Harrison v. Hill.  The Lord Justice General (Lord Clyde) said:

“It is plain, from the terms of the definition, that the class of road intended is wider than the class of public roads to which the public has access in virtue of a positive right belonging to the public, and flowing either from statute or from prescriptive user.”

Caldecote took the view that Lord Clyde’s judgment was applicable in this case because of s.15 of the 1927 Act “the expression ‘road’ means any public highway and any other road to which the public has access.” A road which is not a public highway may, therefore, be a “road” within s. 1(1). The justices came to the conclusion that the forecourt was a “road to which the public has access,” and Caldecote took the view that there was plenty of material on which they could come to that conclusion.

Hawke, J and Humphreys, J agreed with the judgement and the appeal was dismissed.

Related posts:

1. Thomas v Dando [1951]
2. Harrison v Hill [1932]
3. Griffin v Squires [1958]
4. Purves v Muir [1948]
5. Buchanan v Motor Insurance Bureau 1955